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1. IN T R O D U C T I O N
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently received heavy
criticism for its handling of the Asian financial crises in 1997.  Among
others, focus has been put upon the IMF's macroeconomic stabilisation
measures of tight monetary policy and fiscal policy, and more fundamental
measures of structural reform.
Sachs (1998a), for instance, claims that the tightening measures with
immediate bank closures added both to the panic and to the contractionary
force of the financial crisis that were already underway.  Also, Feldstein
(1998) asserts that the IMF's emphasis on imposing major structural reforms,
rather than focusing on balance-of-payments adjustments, will have adverse
consequences.
Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, rejects such criticism arguing
that "the basic approach proves to have been appropriate" (See Camdessus,
1998). Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, argues that "the
reluctance to tighten interest rates forcefully at the beginning has been an
important factor in perpetuating the crisis" (See Fischer, 1998). In response
to Feldstein's criticism of the IMF's fundamental measures, he further argues
that "There is neither point nor excuse for the international community to
provide financial assistance to a country unless that country takes measures to
prevent future such crises".
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the ongoing debate on the role of the
IMF in the Asian financial crisis, with special reference to the case of Korea.
Most critics of the IMF claim that there was no fundamental reason for the
Asian financial crisis except financial panic itself. Using the analogy
between human stroke and financial crisis, however, this paper admits that
fundamental weaknesses had accumulated in Korea and this, along with other
causes, contributed to the occurrence of the financial crisis. In addition this
paper, in line with the stroke analogy, systematically evaluates the IMF's
original program as an emergency measure, and explains why it went wrong.
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2. E V O L U T I O N OF THE CRISIS AND THE IMF PROGRAM
2.1. Causes of the Financial Crisis
Korea's financial crisis underwent a process very similar to a typical
human stroke.1)  The human stroke happens with the sudden blockage of an
artery in the brain by a blood clot or other debris carried in the bloodstream.
A stroke erupts all of a sudden in a person who has been living his/her life
quite normally.  However, it does not strike a real healthy person.  It
normally has its roots in fundamental weaknesses: it only strikes people
whose physical constitution is weak because of high blood pressure, high
blood cholesterol, diabetes and obesity, which cause hardening of the arteries.
Unfriendly surroundings, such as family disputes, competitive personal
relationships and a heavy burden of work, also contribute to the likelihood of
having a stroke.  Strokes normally occur after giving several different kinds
of warning beforehand, such as sudden loss or blurring of vision in one eye.
If the person fails to react properly to the warning signs, then a stroke may
finally occur when there is a sudden sharp stress or a sudden exposure to cold
weather, which work as a trigger.
To most people, the financial crisis appears to have erupted all of a sudden
when the panicked foreign investors turned their backs on Korea. In
retrospect, however, it underwent a process similar to a typical stroke:
fundamental weaknesses, policy mistakes, unfriendly international
circumstances and exogenous shocks all contributed to the crisis.
That is, the financial crisis of Korea had its roots in fundamental
weaknesses in the Korean economy.  Since the late 1980s the government-
led economic policy which was considered to have led the nation to its
remarkable economic success in the 1960s-1980s, was no longer suited as the
Korean economy became larger and more complex and as global competition
intensified. Instead it resulted not only in corruption, but also in moral
hazard and inefficiency in the general economic sector, and a weakening of
                                                
1) The reader is referred to Lee (1999) for a more detailed stroke-analogy approach on the
causes of the Korean financial crisis.
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the international competitiveness of Korean corporations.
On the other hand the international environment, which had been friendly
to Korea's export-oriented growth strategy, became rapidly hostile. Since
the late 1980s Korean companies faced intense competition from foreign
companies in both domestic and international markets.  Competition has
mainly come from the rapid opening of Korea's domestic market, and the
rapid catch-up growth of the newly industrialising countries such as China,
Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. This also put downward pressure on
Korea's competitiveness, and made the Korean economy more vulnerable to
sudden changes in the world economy.
However, the Korean government overlooked the signs of weakening
competitiveness and possibility of financial crisis and, instead, aggravated the
situation by making consecutive mistakes, especially in its exchange rate
policy and financial sector supervision.
Finally, sudden exogenous shocks in early 1997 triggered the financial
crisis to erupt.  There were two different shocks in early 1997: one came
from inside, and the other came from outside.  Along with the economic
cycle of downturn in early 1997 a series of large corporate bankruptcies
began with Hanbo Steel, the fourteenth largest chaebol (huge family-
controlled conglomerates) in Korea.  Before Korea turned to the IMF for
assistance in November, seven out of the top thirty chaebols including Kia
Motors, the eighth largest, faced insolvency.  This resulted in a surge of
non-performing loans held by the commercial banks.  At the end of
September 1997 non-performing loans of all financial institutions recorded W
32 trillion (7 per cent of GDP), about double their level at the end of 1996.
Specifically non-performing loans of commercial banks stood at W 21.9
trillion, which was 6.4 per cent of total credit and was double the W 12.2
trillion at the end of 1996.  At the same time merchant banks recorded non-
performing loans of W 3.9 trillion at the end of October 1997, nearly three
times the W 1.3 trillion at the end of 1996.
On the other hand, the financial cris is in Southeast Asia acted in two ways
as another trigger of the Korean crisis.  First, a drastic devaluation of the
currencies of the crisis countries impeded Korea's already-worsened
international competitiveness, and this contributed to strong downward
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pressure on the Korean currency.  Second, trouble in Southeast Asia  acted
as a wake-up call for foreign investors to re-evaluate the risk of Korea, and to
find out that Korea was already experiencing difficulties in the financial
market with the surge in non-performing loans.  When the Hang Seng Index
of the Hong Kong stock market recorded a big downturn on October 23, 1997,
foreign investors suddenly started together in a panic to withdraw their
investment and to cut back their short-term loans to Korea. The won
depreciated by about 20 per cent against the US dollar through November 30
and the stock market index fell by about 30 per cent to a ten-year low.
Usable foreign currency reserves declined sharply as the Bank of Korea
financed the repayment of short-term debt of Korean commercial banks'
offshore branches.
Finally, Korea turned to the IMF on November 21, 1997 as the rollover
ratio of short-term external borrowings by domestic financial institutions kept
decreasing and the country's usable foreign currency reserves plummeted to
US$ 7.3 billion, down sharply from US$ 22.3 billion only a month before.
2.2. The IMF Program
On December 3, 1997 Korea and the IMF signed an agreement for a
financial aid package totalling US$ 58.3 billion, subject to a broad range of
conditions including macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reform.
The IMF committed emergency funds amounting to US$ 21 billion.
Additional US$ 14 billion was committed by the World Bank and the Asian
Development Bank. As a second line of defence an additional US$ 23.3
billion was pledged by the United States, Japan, Australia  and other
interested countries.
When the IMF program was announced the IMF expected that the large
financing package and reform plan would be enough to turn around market
sentiment. Accordingly, upon the announcement of the program, only US$
5.5 billion was disbursed, and any discussion on debt rescheduling with
international creditors was not attempted.
In line with the IMF Stand-By Arrangement the Korean government was
required to implement tough measures including tight monetary policy, fiscal
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austerity and the immediate closure of insolvent financial institutions. As
an emergency measure the Korean government was asked to raise interest
rates sharply.  This measure was expected to stem the outflow of foreign
funds and the rapid depreciation of the exchange rate. The call rate was
raised from 12.3 per cent on December 1, 1997 to 20.7 per cent on December
3, and further to 30.1 per cent on December 23.  As a consequence yields on
three-year corporate bond soared from around 14 per cent before the crisis to
above 30 per cent, and yields on 91-day commercial paper rose sharply from
13-14 per cent to peak at 40.8 per cent on December 31 (Figure 1).  Broad
money growth (M3) was reduced to 13.9 per cent at the end of December
1997 from 16.3 per cent at the end of November 1997.  The IMF also asked
Korea to take fiscal contractionary adjustments by 1.5 per cent from previous
year and generate a surplus in 1998.
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Figure 1  Market Interest Rates January 1997 to December 1998
  
                                                                    (unit: per cent)
Source: The Bank of Korea.
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Troubled financial institutions would be closed or, if they were deemed
viable, to be restructured and/or recapitalised. Nine insolvent merchant
banks which had been suspended on December 2 were required to submit a
rehabilitation plan within 30 days. If these plans were not approved the
institution's license would be revoked.  The remaining merchant banks were
required to present a program of recapitalisation by December 31, 1997.
They were required to meet at least a 4 per cent capital adequacy ratio of the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) by March 31, 1998. Other
commercial banks were also required to prepare a plan to meet the BIS 8 per
cent minimum requirement by September 1998.  In addition, virtually all
capital account restrictions on foreign investors' access to the bond markets
were to be lifted as of January 1, 1998.
However, the rollover ratio of short-term debt went further down sharply
and usable official reserves were almost depleted in mid-December.  For
example, the rollover ratio of the seven largest commercial banks fell to 32.2
per cent in December from 58.8 per cent in November and 86.5 per cent in
October. After a brief increase to 435 on December 6 from 379 on
December 3, the Korea Stock Price Index (KOSPI) kept sliding to reach 351
on December 24 (Figure 2).  As the speed of depreciation accelerated the
exchange rate rose from about W/US$ 1,150 at the beginning of the month to
almost W/US$ 2,000 at the end of the year 2) (Figure 3).  All of these were in
fact much worse than the IMF had predicted.
When Korea faced imminent default by December 24 the IMF, backed by
the U.S., decided to press the foreign commercial banks to roll over their
short-term credits on an enforced basis. The IMF insisted on the
comprehensive debt rollover as a condition for further disbursements of the
IMF lending package. Initially the banks and the Korean government
announced a freeze on debt servicing.  On January 16 the Korean
government and the banks formally agreed to a complete rollover of all short-
term debts falling due in the first quarter of 1998. On January 28 an
agreement was reached to convert US$ 24 billion in short-term debt into
claims of maturities between 1 and 3 years.  The new arrangements put a
                                                
2) On December 16 the Korean government shifted to a free-floating exchange rate system.
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brake on the fall of the won, and on the decline in the stock market in Korea.
Figure 2  Korea Stock Price Index January 1997 to December 1998
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Figure 3  W/US$ Exchange Rate January 1997 to March 1999
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2.3. Consequences
As market interest rates soared to the 30 to 40 per cent level the financial
difficulties of corporations became deeper.  As the IMF program required
financial institutions to meet the BIS capital adequacy ratios they became
reluctant to provide corporations with funds for fear of incurring new non-
performing loans. Even strong banks came under intense pressure as
foreign creditors refused to roll over loans and domestic depositors fled to
foreign owned banks. The merchant banks, in particular, which used to
provide corporations with short-term funds, virtually suspended new lendings
to corporations and tended to refuse rolling over loans falling due.
This, in turn, made the situation even worse for the debt-ridden
corporations, resulting in a boost of the number of insolvencies (especially of
small and medium-sized companies) to three times the pre-crisis level.
Bankruptcies in Korea hit 3,197 in December 1997 and the figure rose to
3,323 in January 1998, before falling back to 2,749 in March 1998.  The
ratio of dishonoured bills rose drastically to 2.1 per cent in December 1997
from 0.5 per cent in November 1997.
On the other hand the contractionary prescriptions led to a dramatic
reduction in consumption, resulting in a 29 per cent fall in domestic demand
in the first quarter of 1998. During the first quarter of 1998 real GDP
recorded a negative growth rate of -3.6 per cent for the first time in eighteen
years, followed by -7.2 per cent, -7.1 per cent and -5.4 per cent in the second,
third and fourth quarters respectively.  In 1998, real GDP dropped 5.8 per
cent on a year-on-year basis.
Almost 1.66 million jobs were lost in 1998 boosting the unemployment
rate from 2.2 to 7.9 per cent in December 1998, despite a sharp decline in
participation rates.  The yearly unemployment rate for 1998 was 6.8 per cent,
also in stark contrast to the 2.6 per cent of 1997. Per capita GNP is
estimated to have remained at about US$ 6,300 in 1998, down sharply from
US$ 9,511 in 1997 and US$ 10,542 in 1996, and fell short of the $ 6,745
recorded in 1991.3)  Nominal wages dropped 2.5 per cent in 1998 from 1997.
                                                
3) The sharp fall in per capita GNP was attributed not only to the economic contraction, but also
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Meanwhile, the current account, which had recorded a deficit every month
until October 1997, recorded a surplus after November 1997.  In 1998, the
current account recorded a surplus of US$ 40 billion, which was the largest in
history. However, this was brought about mainly by a decline in imports
rather than an increase in exports. Despite the potential for increased
profitability from the exchange rate depreciation, exporters were also badly
affected because exporters with confirmed orders were unable to obtain trade
credits.  In 1998 Korean exports declined 2.8 per cent on a year-on-year
basis to US$ 132.3 billion, while imports plunged 35.5 per cent to US$ 93.3
billion.
3.  EVALUATION
Recovery from a stroke depends on how big an area of the brain is affected,
and how promptly and well it is treated. If treatment for a stroke starts
within hours the clot causing the damage may be dissolved with fewer
complications and less disability. Someone who has just had a stroke is also
at very high risk of having another, possibly more serious, stroke over the
next few days.  Therefore an early and appropriate treatment is imperative to
help prevent having another stroke and which could result in serious
complications.  In the medium- and long-term treatment for the fundamental
causes of strokes such as high blood pressure and diabetes should follow.
Similarly, recovery from a financial crisis depends on how extensive the
capital outflow and exchange rate depreciation are, and how promptly this
trend can be reversed. The first and most immediate way to treat the
financial crisis should be to (1) break the self-reinforcing capital outflows and
to stabilise the domestic currency (i.e., minimise the likelihood of recurrence)
and (2) prevent a collapse of the real sector (i.e., prevent complications).  In
the medium- and long-term, structural reforms are needed to address the root
causes of the crisis.
                                                                                                                   
largely to the won's sharp depreciation.
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3.1. Were the Program's Diagnosis and Prognosis Correct?
A good treatment is based on a thorough examination of the symptoms and
a precise prognosis.  As the IMF later admitted, however, the initial targets
proved wrong as the key economic variables such as real growth rate and
unemployment rate turned out to be worse than initially predicted. As shown
in Table 1 the depth of the slowdown was not foreseen in the initial program
projections, and major macroeconomic projections were revised sharply and
successively downward during the course of the program.4)
That there were sharp revisions to projections for growth and exchange
rates meant that the program was built on an unreliable (to put it more
precisely, 'wrong') diagnosis and prognosis. This implies that the IMF
program (especially the original one) may have been an inadequate treatment
for the Korean financial crisis.  As the projections failed to be realised,
confidence in the program may have been undermined.
Table 1  The IMF's Macroeconomic Projections and
Actual Results for 1998
Original
Program
(12/97)
First
Quarterly
Program
(2/98)
Second
Quarterly
Program
(5/98)
Third
Quarterly
Program
(7/98)
Fourth
Quarterly
Program
(11/98)
Actual
Results
(12/98)
Real GDP
growth rate +3.0 % +1.0 % -1.0 % -4.0 % NA -5.8 %
Inflation
rate Below 5 % Below 10% Below 10 % 9.0 % NA 7.5 %
Exchange
rate
(W/US$) 1,186 1,426 1,417 1,440 1,425 1,399
Current
account
(US dollars)
(% of GDP)
Deficit of
NA
Below1%
Surplus of
8 billion
2.5%
Surplus of
23 billion
7%
Surplus of
35 billion
   NA
     
  NA
  NA
Surplus of
40 billion
10.6%
Fiscal target
(% of GDP)
Surplus of
0.2%
Deficit of
1.5% NA
Deficit of
4.0%
Deficit of
5.0%
Deficit of
5%
Note: The inflation rate is the percentage change in the consumer price index on a year-on-year basis.
                                                
4) The IMF also made similar mistakes in forecasting the consequences of financial crisis and
their program of other crisis countries. For example, the major projections for Thailand and
Indonesia were revised four times, respectively in the first year of the program.
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As will be discussed below, the wrong projections (prognosis) led to
inappropriate measures (treatment), and these obviously contributed to the
recession (complication).  As Jack Boorman, Director of the IMF's Policy
Development and Review Department, admits, "the original IMF program
was based on the view that the Korean economy would experience a
slowdown in growth, but not a deep recession. " (see Boorman, 1999)  So
measures such as tight monetary and fiscal policy along with high interest
rates were adopted.  These contributed to the recession, and were reversed
when the recession turned out to be deeper than expected.  At their meetings
in January 1998 the Korean government and the IMF agreed to allow for an
increased fiscal deficit. In February 1998 the two sides also agreed to allow
for lower interest rates, and the downward rate adjustment was implemented
over the following months. But when the tightening was reversed and an
expansionary policy was adopted it was too late, as the IMF program
measures put a heavy strain on the already-troubled real economy and caused
the economic contraction to be a full-fledged one.
Why did the IMF's major macroeconomic projections turn out to be
wrong? Hubert Neiss, Director of the IMF's Asia and Pacific Department,
argues that this was because "important decisions in several complex and
painful areas had to be made almost overnight and without full information"
(see Neiss, 1998).  This argument may hold for the original projections of
the program. But how was it possible for the projections to be changed
significantly five times in less than a year? The IMF claims that this reflects
the flexibility of the program.  But this raises a question about the credibility
of the IMF as a doctor.
3.2. Did the Program Help Stabilise the Financial Market?
In short, some measures of the initial rescue program failed to meet the
objective of restoring market confidence, and actually intensified the panic
psychology of the international investors.  In the first few weeks after the
IMF arrangement was announced, the exchange rate depreciated even further
(Figure 3).
There were many reasons for this.  First, based on a naive projection of
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the economy, the IMF did not attempt to press the foreign commercial banks
to roll over their short-term credits on an enforced basis. Only when the
situation became even worse did the IMF insist on a comprehensive debt
rollover as a condition for further disbursements of the IMF lending package.
In retrospect, some debt relief in the shape of loan rollovers and restructuring
were necessary to allow more time for repayment.
Second, despite the pledge of US$ 58.3 billion in emergency funds to
Korea, only a limited amount of funds was disbursed.  Upon announcement
of the Stand-By Arrangement, only US$ 5.5 billion was disbursed; by the end
of 1997, only US$ 13.2 billion was actually disbursed. This amount was
reached only after the emergency acceleration of disbursements on December
24. Of the total emergency funds US$ 22 billion were contingency funds as
the 'second lines of defence' from individual countries, and the precise terms
and conditions under which the second lines of defence would be disbursed
were never clearly specified. The IMF economists, Lane, et al. (1999),
admit that uncertainties about the availability of the second lines of defence
may have influenced market participants in their decision to continue their
exit.
Third, recommendations on tight budgets, bank closures and high interest
rates contributed to even higher number of business insolvencies, and this in
turn worsened investors' perceptions of Korea's external creditworthiness.
This point deserves more detailed discussion as the IMF points to the ultimate
steady appreciation of the won as proof of the correctness of their
prescriptions.
When domestic and foreign currency bonds are perfect substitutes the
foreign exchange market is in equilibrium only if the interest parity condition
holds:
$/W$/W$/W$W )( EEERR
e -+=                    (1)
where RW  is the interest rate on domestic currency (W) deposits, R$ is the
interest rate on foreign currency ($) deposits, eE $/W  is the expected future
W/$ exchange rate, and EW/$ is the current W/$ exchange rate.  For a given
dollar interest rate R$, if the won interest rate increases then the Korean won
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will appreciate against the US dollar as investors all try to shift their funds
into won.  This was what the IMF program of high interest rate policy
expected to see.
However, when domestic and foreign currency bonds are imperfect
substitutes, the condition does not hold any longer.  Instead, the equilibrium
condition above needs to incorporate a risk premium. Thus equation (1)
becomes (2)
p+-+= $W$W$/W$W )( EEERR
e               (2)
where p is a risk premium that reflects the difference between the riskiness of
domestic and foreign bonds. If the IMF was right, a sharp increase in
interest rates should have stabilised the exchange rate.  As seen in Figure 3,
however, the exchange rate quickly depreciated far below the targets set in
the program. The tight money supply and high interest rates triggered more
corporate failures, and this was, of course, far from improving public
confidence.  The resulting financial instability and unrest might have caused
risk premium, ð, to rise sharply, resulting in net capital outflow instead of the
inflow. This may have resulted in the free-falls of the Korean currency.
Furthermore there is very little evidence that the hikes in interest rates
brought about capital inflow.  For instance, during the first quarter of 1998
the net foreign portfolio investment was merely US$ 7.5 billion, which is too
little to stabilise the exchange rate.  The Korean won appreciated during the
same period because of the international financial assistance of US$ 21.4
billion, a success in rolling over most short-term external debt of banking
sector totalling US$ 21.8 billion in March 1998, and a record trade surplus of
US$ 12.3 billion.
As Radelet and Sachs (1998b) point out the first signs of the end of the
currency free-falls only came on December 24, when the IMF initiated a
different approach to the problem based on debt restructuring, accelerated
disbursements of international funding, and more comprehensive and rational
financial sector restructuring.
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3.3. Did the Program Help Prevent Complication?
As noted above the IMF measures were based on seriously inaccurate
projections of the Korean economy. Accordingly, the original program
included measures such as immediate closures of some financial institutions,
tight budgets and high interest rates.
These measures were designed mainly to stabilise the financial market.
But, as noted above, it is doubtful that they were successful in stabilising the
financial market as they increased perceptions of risk in the Korean economy.
These measures needlessly aggravated the distress of the real sector and
intensified the crisis , as the much higher interest rates and cuts in domestic
demand caused many profitable but high debt-equity firms into bankruptcy.
Thus the external liquidity crisis became a full-fledged economic crisis as the
full extent of the collateral damage to the real sector became apparent.  Even
in the United States, or in any other advanced countries, many firms would
experience severe financial difficulties if market interest rates were over 30
per cent.
The IMF reversed the tightening and adopted an expansionary policy in
early 1998, when the real economy started sliding into a recession.  But this
policy change came too late to prevent the massive economic contraction.  
In sum, the IMF's serious inability to make credible projections resulted in
wrong prescriptions and treatment, which in turn deepened the woes of the
already-troubled Korean economy.
3.4. Did the Program Address the Fundamental Causes Properly?
As briefly discussed above the Korean crisis had its roots in the weakened
fundamentals of the Korean economy. Therefore, attempting to stabilise
only the financial market without an emphasis on structural reforms is like
treating symptoms without addressing causes.
As a matter of fact the IMF program had a heavy emphasis on structural
reforms of the Korean economy.  Since the beginning of the IMF program
Korea has undertaken structural reforms in the financial sector, corporate
sector, labour market, and public sector, which are considered to be essential
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for the revival of sustained growth.  Nonetheless, two points are made with
regard to the timing of the fundamental measures of the IMF program.
First, when the IMF program was first implemented in December 1997, it
should have concentrated on helping Korea to cope with temporary foreign
exchange shortages and regaining access to international capital markets.
Also, the rescue fund should not have been contingent upon the process of
economic reform. This is not because the Korean economy was
fundamentally healthy and structural reform was not necessary, but because
an emergency measure for stabilisation should have come first in order to
prevent unnecessary complications of the crisis.  That is, an emergency
measure should have come first to achieve the short-run goal of financial
stabilisation, and then the fundamental measures should have come next to
achieve the long-run goal of structural reform.
Secondly, as a condition for financial aid, the IMF required Korea to
undertake reforms that were not closely related to restoring market
confidence and Korea's ability to repay its debt. To be more specific  a
timetable for trade liberalisation was required to be set to eliminate trade-
related subsidies, restrictive import licensing, and the import diversification
program. It is questionable, however, how it would help Korea, which
would need enormous current account surpluses to repay its foreign debts and
recover from the crisis. As the IMF insisted, trade liberalisation would
enhance domestic competition.  But this was a measure which should have
been pursued at a later stage because the corporations were already severely
hit by high interest rates, credit crunches and a drastic downfall in demand for
their products
4. C O N C L U D I N G  R E M A R K S
Like a stroke, which strikes a person all of a sudden, financial crisis
erupted in Korea with a surprise in late 1997.  Korea was first taken to a
hospital – the IMF, where it underwent an emergency operation.  The IMF's
emergency operation, however, was built on a wrong diagnosis and prognosis,
obviously intensified the financial crisis, and caused the economic
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contraction to be a full-fledged one.
Of course, the opposite approach would not have been desirable either.
Pursuing an expansionary monetary policy and lowering interest rates would
have caused the exchange rate to over-depreciate, have lead to hyperinflation
and damaged companies with unhedged obligations needing to repay large
foreign debt. The point here is that the initial program should have avoided
excessive tightening, and should have concentrated on the rescheduling of the
foreign debt.
In addition, instead of using most of the emergency IMF loans to meet the
debt servicing obligations coming due, a portion of the IMF loans should
have been used to help finance credits for manufactures and exporters who
were facing a sharp credit squeeze because of the financial crisis.
The IMF has never publicly acknowledged that the original policies were
too contractionary. However, the IMF implicitly acknowledged this when it
reversed these policies later.  The IMF should acknowledge its mistakes and
commit itself publicly to avoiding a repetition of them.
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